UK Sanctions 18 Crypto Firms Tied to Russia’s $90B War Network

• UK sanctioned 18 crypto firms tied to A7 network processing $90 billion in 2025 for Russian war funding
• Huobi transferred $4.9 billion to sanctioned entities since 2021, with $1.13 billion occurring after Garantex’s March 2025 takedown
• Illicit crypto activity surged in 2024, with A7’s A7A5 token alone representing $72 billion in trading volume

• $90B Total processed by A7 network in 2025 versus prior underground payment channels
• $4.9B Huobi’s cumulative transfers to sanctioned entities and A7 since 2021
• $72B Trading volume in A7A5 token alone, exceeding many nation-state crypto treasuries

The UK Foreign Office has moved to disrupt a sophisticated sanctions evasion network by adding 18 crypto exchanges, banks, and payment platforms to its consolidated sanctions list, effective immediately. The action targets entities accused of processing more than $90 billion in 2025 through the Kremlin-backed A7 payment network to finance Russia’s military operations in Ukraine.

According to analysis by blockchain intelligence firm TRM Labs, the sanctioned platforms deliberately migrated Russian illicit flows away from takedown targets like Garantex, which the UK shut down in March 2025, to successor exchanges including Rapira, Aifory Pro, Grinex.io, and ABCex.

The designation requires all UK-registered businesses to freeze any assets held by these entities and block all transactions involving them, a measure designed to choke off financial pathways that have grown increasingly sophisticated since Russia’s 2022 invasion.

Huobi Emerges as Largest Single Facilitator of Sanctioned Russian Transfers

TRM Labs research identifies Huobi, a major global crypto exchange, as the single largest conduit for moving funds to UK-sanctioned entities, having transferred $4.9 billion in on-chain transactions to sanctioned accounts and the A7 network since 2021.

The scale of Huobi’s involvement underscores how mainstream crypto platforms became embedded in Russia’s sanctions evasion infrastructure over a four-year period.

Most striking is the timing: $1.13 billion of Huobi’s transfers to sanctioned entities occurred in the 14 months following Garantex’s March 2025 takedown, indicating that Huobi absorbed significant flow volume as successor platforms came online.

Exmo Exchange processed $19.5 million in direct transactions with sanctioned firms including Garantex and Chatex, while BitPapa transferred millions to the same entities.

The pattern suggests a network of exchanges functioning as intermediaries rather than independent platforms, when one node was removed, flows redistributed across remaining counterparties without disruption to the underlying A7 system.

Second-tier platforms demonstrated the depth of the network’s redundancy. Rapira moved $543 million through sanctioned channels, Aifory Pro transferred $189 million, and ABCex recorded $355 million across restricted firms.

The interlocking nature of these transfers, Aifory Pro sending $175.2 million to ABCex, ABCex routing $133.4 million back to Garantex, reveals a deliberate design to obfuscate beneficial ownership and create plausible deniability for individual platform operators.

A7’s A7A5 Token Generated $72 Billion in Trading Volume Despite Sanctions Pressure

Analysis of A7 network activity reveals that illicit crypto trading related to Russia surged in 2024 rather than declining. The A7A5 token alone accounted for $72 billion in trading volume, while A7’s own wallets generated an additional $39 billion, a combined $111 billion in activity concentrated within a single sanctions evasion network.

These figures dwarf the transaction volumes of many legitimate crypto projects and institutional on-chain activities, indicating that A7 functions not as a niche shadow system but as a primary financial channel for Kremlin-linked actors.

A TRM Labs investigation identified that most of this activity flowed through Garantex and Grinex.io, two platforms that now sit atop the UK’s sanctions list. The persistence of high-volume trading even as regulatory pressure mounted suggests either inadequate detection by compliance teams at major exchanges or deliberate tolerance of flows by platform operators aware of their provenance.

The involvement of a major global crypto exchange backing A7, which TRM reports transferred over $1.5 billion into Kremlin-linked financial channels, points to institutional-grade participation rather than isolated bad actors within individual platforms.

The scale of A7A5 trading volume also raises questions about whether detection systems at compliant exchanges adequately identify token-based evasion schemes.

Unlike peer-to-peer cash transfers or mixing services, tokenized payment networks create on-chain audit trails while relying on opacity around beneficial ownership and end-use intent, a structural vulnerability that regulators now clearly recognize.

Kyrgyz Bank and Major Exchange Named as A7’s Core Infrastructure Partners

The UK government’s investigation identified two critical A7 network partners: a Kyrgyz bank suspected of processing payments within the A7 system and a major global crypto exchange believed to have transferred $1.5 billion back into Kremlin-linked financial channels.

The Kyrgyz bank connection reveals geographic diversification of A7’s infrastructure, by embedding payment processing in Central Asia, the network exploited jurisdictional gaps between Western sanctions regimes and countries with weaker compliance enforcement.

The role of a “major global crypto exchange” in the A7 ecosystem is particularly significant for institutional investors. While the UK announcement does not name this exchange, the scale of $1.5 billion in outbound transfers suggests it is one of the world’s top 20 platforms by trading volume.

This implicates not only operational controls but potentially board-level decision-making about acceptable counterparty risk and customer due diligence standards.

For institutional investors and asset managers, the involvement of a major global exchange in A7 creates legal and reputational exposure. Any fund holding assets on that exchange faces indirect association with sanctions evasion infrastructure.

Conversely, exchanges enforcing rigorous geographic controls and transaction monitoring now have a competitive advantage in attracting institutional capital that demands sanctions compliance certainty.

UK Sanctions Designation Closes the Garantex Loophole That Crypto Networks Exploited

The March 2025 takedown of Garantex created the conditions for the current expansion of A7 successor platforms. In the 14 months following that action, Huobi alone moved $1.13 billion to sanctioned entities, while Rapira, Aifory Pro, Grinex.io, and ABCex collectively absorbed the redistribution of flows that Garantex previously handled.

The UK’s decision to sanction all 18 entities simultaneously, rather than sequentially, signals an attempt to close this loophole and prevent a third migration.

The designation also extends to individuals linked to the A7 network, adding a criminal dimension beyond asset freezes. This suggests that ongoing investigations may lead to extradition requests or interpol notices, creating personal liability for platform operators and compliance officers who knowingly facilitated the network’s operations.

For exchanges and platforms, the timing of sanctions announcements matters enormously. Institutional investors now track the lag between intelligence gathering and public designation.

TRM Labs’ March 2025 analysis of successor platform flows enabled the July 2025 sanctions action, a four-month window during which platforms operating in the UK could have exited Russian-linked relationships before designation became effective.

The fact that the UK moved comprehensively against 18 entities simultaneously suggests confidence in forensic evidence and likely precedes additional enforcement actions in allied jurisdictions.

Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper stated: “If the Kremlin thinks it can evade our sanctions by hiding behind crypto networks and shadow financial systems,

Original reporting: cryptopotato.com