Bitquery traces $1.58M Fluidkey drain to hijacked relayer through logging tool exploit
Bitquery’s on-chain investigation confirms that Fluidkey’s own payment infrastructure, not a user-side key leak, moved at least $1.58 million out of customer accounts across six blockchains in just 36 minutes. For institutions evaluating privacy wallets as settlement infrastructure, the episode shows that non-custodial key design offers little protection if the relayer that signs on a user’s behalf can be hijacked through an unrelated third-party tool.
- Bitquery traced at least $1.58 million stolen from Fluidkey users across six chains between 17:28 and 18:04 UTC on November 19, 2026.
- Fluidkey pushed app version 1.79.22 on November 20, 2026, blocking every older build from sending funds until users update.
- Attackers moved 881.6 ETH, roughly $1.57 million, into Tornado Cash between 20:05 and 21:29 UTC the same evening.
- $1.58M traced to attacker wallets, versus a $1.63M independent GitHub estimate
- 36 min drain window, up from a baseline under 30 transactions an hour
- $837K lost on Base, more than the $660K lost on Ethereum
Bitquery’s on-chain investigation found that Fluidkey’s relayer, the service that pays gas and submits transactions on a user’s behalf, paid at least $1.58 million out of accounts on Ethereum, Base, BNB Chain, Optimism, Arbitrum and Polygon in a single 36-minute window on Thursday, November 19, 2026. Fluidkey, a privacy wallet that shields holdings by routing each payment to a freshly generated stealth address so outsiders cannot total a user’s balance, said in a statement on X that an attacker exploited vulnerabilities in a third-party logging tool to steal session data, a cause it detailed in that same statement.
The stolen session data let the attacker queue unauthorized transfers on Fluidkey’s servers that were then signed automatically the moment a user next opened the app. Fluidkey said private keys never left users’ devices throughout the attack.
Bitquery Shows Relayer Volume Spiked During the Nov. 19 Drain
Bitquery’s data shows the relayer stayed quiet in the days before the attack, never exceeding 30 transactions per hour on Base and Ethereum combined on November 18 or the morning of November 19.
Half of the attacker’s eventual $1.58 million take had already been paid out within five minutes of the drain starting, Bitquery found. Base users lost the most at roughly $837,000, ahead of Ethereum’s $660,000, and the single largest transfer, $415,783 in USDT pulled from two Ethereum accounts, accounted for roughly a quarter of the entire haul.
Not every payout went to the attacker. One user moved $277,000 to a wallet they had used since 2024 while the drain was still running. Fluidkey put all services offline at 18:05 UTC and said no unauthorized transactions had occurred since.
Version 1.79.22 Closes the Gap Between Session Theft and Signing
Fluidkey’s patch, pushed on Friday, November 20, 2026, stops the exact mechanism the attacker used: transfers can no longer be pre-staged on the server and silently signed when a user opens the app. The company said the update adds unspecified additional safeguards at the signing step and applies across its web, iOS and Android clients.
Every pre-patch version has been locked out of sending funds, forcing all users to update in Settings before transacting again, an unusually blunt fix that treats the entire prior app population as compromised rather than isolating affected accounts.
Fluidkey has not named the third-party logging vendor, disclosed how many users were affected, or said whether the vendor has itself patched the underlying flaw, leaving the scope of exposure to other apps using the same tool an open question.
SEAL 911 Assists as Attacker Funds Reach Tornado Cash
Fluidkey said the volunteer incident-response group SEAL 911 is helping trace the stolen funds. Bitquery found the attacker’s wallets had drawn their first ETH from Tornado Cash hours before the drain began, then returned 881.6 ETH, worth roughly $1.57 million at the time, to the same mixer across six wallets between 20:05 and 21:29 UTC, close to matching the amount stolen.
The pattern echoes a drain the exploiters behind crypto-based laundering schemes have used repeatedly, and mirrors how the Drift Protocol attackers also routed stolen funds through Tornado Cash. Predict.fun offered refunds in October after a drain it attributed to a compromised third-party website, a precedent Fluidkey has not yet matched with a public commitment.
The CCS read. This incident is less about Fluidkey’s code than about relayer-dependent wallet designs generally: any privacy architecture that outsources signing or session management to a backend service inherits that backend’s attack surface, regardless of where the private key sits. Institutions assessing privacy wallets for settlement should treat “keys never left the device” as a necessary but insufficient assurance and scrutinize session and relayer security separately.
Fluidkey has said it will contact affected users individually and publish a full post-mortem, but has not set a date or confirmed whether it will offer refunds along the lines of Predict.fun’s October response. Bitquery’s range of $1.58 million to $1.64 million, versus an independent $