Optimizely platform compromise steals $7,000 in crypto from 178 major websites
Malicious code injected into Optimizely’s platform affected 178 major websites including HSBC, Zoom, and CNN, stealing cryptocurrency and payment card data in real time. For institutional investors, this exposes the systemic risk of relying on third-party JavaScript dependencies without strict content security controls, a vulnerability that leaves even regulated financial platforms exposed.
- 188 Optimizely code snippets across 178 organizations compromised on November 16, including HSBC, Zoom, Salesforce, IKEA, and major news outlets.
- Attacker’s wallets received approximately $7,000 in cryptocurrency, plus card data from affected visitors.
- Only 24 of 256 affected organization hosts ran Content Security Policy rules strong enough to block the payload entirely.
- 178 organizations hit by malware through one platform dependency.
- $7,040 in confirmed cryptocurrency stolen within nine hours of attack discovery.
- 24 of 256 hosts protected by effective Content Security Policy enforcement.
On November 16 (Monday), malicious JavaScript served through Optimizely’s Web experimentation platform compromised visitor traffic to 178 of the world’s largest websites, according to Report URI’s technical analysis. The attacker injected code into an optional Project JavaScript field in Optimizely customer dashboards, which the company’s content delivery network then distributed under its own trusted domain and certificate to every visitor. Within hours, the malware stole cryptocurrency by replacing legitimate wallet addresses with the attacker’s own, skimmed payment card details, extracted cookies and screenshots, and deployed iOS exploit kits called Coruna and DarkSword on Apple devices. By 19:25 UTC that day, the attacker had accumulated approximately $7,040 across Bitcoin, Litecoin, Ethereum, USDT, and TRON wallets.
Optimizely’s customer dashboard compromised with unknown attacker access method
The attack vector bypassed Optimizely’s own infrastructure. The injected code was placed directly into customer project settings, a field intended for custom JavaScript that organizations write themselves, rather than through a compromise of Optimizely’s CDN or certificate system.
The company’s CDN served exactly what it was given, making this a credential or authentication breach rather than infrastructure poisoning.
The attacker’s method for gaining write access to so many unrelated customer projects remains unexplained. Possibilities include a compromised Optimizely system, stolen credentials with cross-customer permissions, or a vulnerability in the platform’s access controls.
Optimizely’s own websites, www.optimizely.com and login.optimizely.com, were themselves affected, suggesting the compromise ran deep enough to touch the company’s internal deployments.
Crypto swapped, cards skimmed, and iPhones exploited across a single payload
The track.js payload, rebuilt 26 times during the attack day, performed multiple theft functions simultaneously. The script scanned every page for valid wallet addresses across nine blockchain networks, Bitcoin, Ethereum, EVM chains, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash, and Dogecoin, and replaced them with attacker-controlled addresses.
It validated checksums to ensure only real addresses were swapped, then replaced targets in page text, form fields, links, images, clipboard content, and outgoing network requests. Any visitor who copied an address from an affected site or anywhere else while that tab remained open risked pasting the attacker’s address instead.
Beginning at 13:43 UTC, the script added a card skimmer that monitored form submissions and fetch/XHR POST requests for complete payment card data, card number, expiry date, and CVV. Stolen cards were exfiltrated via navigator.sendBeacon to avoid blocking.
Cards entered into hosted payment processors like Stripe or Adyen were beyond the malware’s reach, but cards typed directly into a site’s own form fields were fully exposed. The script loaded exploit chains through separate domains for Coruna and Darksword, with Coruna targeting iOS 13 to 17 and Darksword targeting iOS 18.x; iOS 18.7.3 and iOS 26.3 had been patched against these chains.
Content Security Policy absent or misconfigured on 232 of 256 affected hosts
Report URI’s analysis of 256 hosts belonging to affected organizations revealed a critical gap in browser-level defenses. Only 24 hosts had Content Security Policy (CSP) rules configured to block the malicious payload outright. Another 50 had policies that allowed both the payload and data theft.
A further 14 blocked data theft but still permitted address swapping. The remaining 68 hosts had no CSP in place at all, leaving them entirely reliant on application-level or network-layer controls to catch such attacks.
Content Security Policy functions as a whitelist, instructing the browser which domains may load scripts or receive data. Had affected organizations enforced CSP in block mode rather than report-only mode, most attack vectors would have failed at the browser level.
The incident underscores that third-party JavaScript dependencies, even those served from trusted domains like cdn.optimizely.com, can become attack surfaces if the third party itself is compromised. No organization using Optimizely can rely solely on the vendor’s security; defense requires independent controls.
The CCS read. This attack illustrates why institutional custodians and exchanges now require cold storage, hardware signing, and air-gapped infrastructure for large holdings. Desktop and mobile wallet users remain exposed to supply-chain malware that bypasses exchange-level controls entirely. The theft amount, $7,040 in a few hours, reflects mostly retail and small-business visitors; a comparable attack on an institutional portal holding accessible private keys could extract far more.
However, Optimizely has not publicly disclosed whether it has identified the attacker’s method of access, whether other customer projects remain at risk, or what changes it will make to prevent cross-customer credential compromise. Organizations must verify their own CSP configurations and check their transaction logs for fraudulent withdrawals; anyone who visited affected sites should monitor their cryptocurrency wallets and credit card statements.